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ARGUMENTS 
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A 
CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE UNRELIABILITY OF 
POLYGRAPH DATA CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL THAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGITIMATE TRIAL 
STRATEGY AND WHICH, IN TURN# PRECLUDED MR. PIERCE FROM 
THE RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. 
In its Brief, the State argues that appointed trial counsel's 
failure to request a jury instruction, which would have cautioned 
the jury about the unreliability of prejudicial polygraph 
evidence, constituted "legitimate trial strategy . . . for such 
inaction." See Brief of Appellee, p. 9. The record on appeal, 
including the facts surrounding appointed trial counsel's trial 
strategy and the nature in which the State presented and utilized 
the polygraph evidence demonstrates otherwise. 
As with any ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
defendant must demonstrate first that his counsel rendered 
deficient performance, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fl9, 12 P. 3d 92 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984)). Second, 
the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. 
Under the first Strickland prong, the defendant is required 
to "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the circumstances, 
4 
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy."" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct 
2052) (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158 
(1955)) . In the course of evaluating a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the appellate court gives '"trial counsel 
wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question 
such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting 
them.'" Id. (quoting State v. Crosby, 927 P. 2d 638, 644 (Utah 
1996)). Although appellate courts are not normally required to 
second-guess matters of trial strategy, where the error is 
"particularly obvious or egregious and would serve no conceivable 
strategic purpose, courts and opposing parties may not simply turn 
a blind eye to a manifest procedural or substantial injustice." 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) . 
In the instant case, there is no reasonable basis for 
appointed trial counsel's failure to request and have the jury 
instructed as to the insufficient reliability of polygraph 
evidence. At trial, the prosecution alerted the jury that Mr. 
Pierce had taken a polygraph examination, and that the Polygraph 
Examiner, which is employed at the Davis County Sheriff's Office, 
would testify as an expert witness (R. 226:145-46) . In the course 
of doing so, the prosecution alerted the jury that Mr. Pierce had 
failed the polygraph examination (Id.). Appointed trial counsel 
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made absolutely no mention of the polygraph examination during 
opening statement (R. 226:147-49). 
When called to testify during the State's case-in-chief, Mr. 
Lon Brian, the Polygraph Examiner with the Davis County Sheriff's 
Office, testified as an expert witness concerning the results of 
Mr. Pierce's polygraph examination (R. 226:193-213). Mr. Brian's 
testimony emphasized the results of the examination that Mr. 
Pierce had been deceptive when he denied any sexual contact with 
the alleged victim (R. 226:197-99). 
Appointed trial counsel's strategy at trial, as demonstrated 
by his cross-examination of the State's expert witness, focused 
exclusively on discrediting the reliability of polygraph 
examinations. This is evinced by both appointed trial counsel's 
cross-examination of the prosecution's expert and the presentation 
of the Affidavit of William G. Iacono, Ph.D. (Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 2), a researcher of polygraph testing, that polygraph 
examinations can only determine when a person responds stronger to 
one type of question than another (See Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Brief of 
Appellant as Addendum C; see also R. 226:205). 
The failure of appointed trial counsel to propose a 
cautionary jury instruction as to the inherent unreliability of 
polygraph data directly contradicts the aforementioned trial 
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strategy utilized during trial. Rather, such a cautionary 
instruction would have substantially aided this trial strategy 
expressly employed by appointed trial counsel. Consequently, 
there is no reasonable basis for appointed trial counsel not to 
request a cautionary instruction to the jury from the court that 
polygraph data is insufficiently reliable for conviction purposes. 
See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996). 
Quite simply, appointed trial counsel failed to request a 
cautionary jury instruction that would have substantially aided 
appointed trial counsel's own trial strategy employed during the 
course of trial. Moreover, such a jury instruction would have 
impressed upon the jury, as an instruction directly from the 
court, that any polygraph evidence or data is net sufficiently 
reliable so as to justify the tendency of a jury, as the fact 
finder, to be overawed by the test results. 
Under the second Strickland prong, which is otherwise known 
as the prejudice prong, the defendant is required to show that 
there is a "'reasonable probability' that the result would have 
been different.'" State v. Hall, 946 P. 2d 712, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). 
UA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
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confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 
S.Ct. at 2068. 
Based on the foregoing, there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been difference had such a cautionary 
jury instruction been utilized at trial. Consequently, this 
Court's confidence in the outcome should be, at the very least, 
undermined. This is especially true in the instant case because 
the jury, as fact finder, when presented with polygraph data by 
way of expert testimony, was, more than likely, overawed by the 
polygraph test results and therefore too willing to abdicate its 
truth-finding function to the expert witness and his so-called 
polygraph data results. The polygraph data presented at trial 
encouraged the jury, as the fact finder, to abdicate its truth-
finding responsibility to the polygraph examiner and his purported 
results. The failure to provide the appropriate jury instruction 
deprived Mr. Pierce of his right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing as well as that set forth in the Brief 
of Appellant, which was previously filed with this Court, Mr. 
Pierce respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
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convictions and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with the Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of December, 2004. 
GINS, P.C. 
ys f£rJsAp£>ellant 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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